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We provide cross-country evidence on the relative importance of cyclical and structural 
factors in explaining unemployment, including the sharp rise in U.S. long-term 
unemployment during the Great Recession of 2007-09. About 75% of the forecast error 
variance of unemployment is accounted for by cyclical factors—real GDP changes (“Okun’s 
Law”), monetary and fiscal policies, and the uncertainty effects emphasized by Bloom 
(2009). Structural factors, which we measure using the dispersion of industry-level stock 
returns, account for the remaining 25 percent. For U.S. long-term unemployment the split 
between cyclical and structural factors is closer to 60-40, including during the Great 
Recession.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Are persistent increases in unemployment cyclical or structural? The question is 
timely and timeless. It is timely because the sharp run-up in U.S. unemployment rates since 
2007 has triggered a debate on the contribution of structural factors; it is timeless because 
nearly every persistent increase in unemployment over the past 100 years has been marked 
by a debate of this kind. Krugman (2010) states that the present “high unemployment in 
America is the result of inadequate demand—full stop”, whereas Kocherlakota (2010) asserts 
that  “firms have jobs, but can't find appropriate workers. The workers want to work, but 
can't find appropriate jobs.”  
 
The jobless recovery following the 2001 U.S. recession led some observers, notably 
Groshen and Potter (2003), to assign a significant role to structural factors, while others took 
a more skeptical view (e.g. Aaronson, Rissman and Sullivan, 2004). Going further back in 
time, the persistent unemployment of the Great Depression was also attributed by some to “a 
great shortage of labor of certain kinds” (Clague 1935). Likewise, the causes of the  high 
unemployment in Great Britain during the interwar years were  a matter of intense debate 
then and to this day (see Benjamin and Kochin, 1979; Loungani, 1991; Brainard, 1992; 
Nason and Vahey, 2006).   
 
The U.S. unemployment rate rose sharply over the Great Recession of 2007-09—
from 4.4 percent in May 2007 to 10.1 percent in October 2009—accompanied by a striking 
increase in the duration of unemployment. As shown in Figure 1, while the average duration 
of unemployment has been inching upwards for a number of years, it rose sharply in the 
recession and continued to increase well after the peak in the unemployment rate. Recent 
readings, which show average unemployment spells in excess of 30 weeks, are more than 10 
weeks above the previous highest duration seen in data going back to the early 1960s.   
 
Figure 2 shows the breakdown of unemployment by duration of unemployment 
spells, which underlie the changes in average duration. While short-term spells (less than 5 
weeks) also showed an uptick, it is the increase in medium-term and long-term spells (greater 4 
 
 
than 27 weeks) that is particularly alarming. In Figure 3, the increase in U.S. unemployment 
rates during the Great Recession is compared with that in 12 other industrialized countries. 
While there have been increases elsewhere as well, there is also considerable heterogeneity in 
unemployment outcomes. 
 
The severity and persistence of output declines during the Great Recession are clearly 
the dominant factor  in pushing up U.S. unemployment (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2010) and 
in explaining the cross-country differences in unemployment (IMF 2010).  But studies by 
Kirkegaard (2009) and Sahin, Song, Topa and Violante (2011) suggest that structural factors 
may have played a role as well. Kirkegaard (2009)  extends the analysis of Groshen and 
Potter to study structural and cyclical employment trends in the U.S. economy during the 
Great Recession. He finds that there has been a sharp increase in “the relative employment 
weight of industries undergoing structural change in the current cycle”, which he concludes 
“can be expected to increase the necessity for unemployed Americans to take new jobs in 
industries different from the ones in which they were previously employed.” 
 
Sahin, Song, Topa and Violante (2011) measure mismatch in the U.S. and U.K. labor 
market, defined as the distance between the observed allocation of unemployment across 
sectors and the allocation that would prevail under costless mobility. Using data on 
unemployment and vacancies they find that between 0.8 and 1.4 percentage points of the 
increase in U.S. unemployment during the Great Recession can be attributed to mismatch. 
This corresponds to between 20% and 25% of the observed increase in unemployment. They 
also find industrial and occupational mismatches, rather than geographic mismatch, are the 
sources of the increased unemployment. For the U.K. they find that 0.8 percent of the 
increased unemployment—which corresponds to a third of the increase—during the Great 
Recession was due to mismatch.
2  
                                                 
2 Barnichon and Figura (2011) study the determinants of the U.S. economy’s matching efficiency, i.e., 
the number of job matches formed each period conditional on unemployment and vacancies. They find that 
until 2006, most of the changes in matching efficiency could be explained by changes in the composition of the 
unemployed (for instance, the relative prevalence of workers on temporary vs. permanent layoffs). Since 2006, 




Estevao and Tsounta (2011) find that “increases in skill mismatches in [U.S.] states 
with worse housing market conditions … are associated with even higher unemployment 
rates, after controlling for all cyclical factors.” They suggest that this could be because “bad 
local housing conditions may slow the exodus of jobless individuals from a depressed area, 
thus raising equilibrium unemployment rates.” They estimate that the combined impact of 
skill mismatches and higher foreclosure rates might have raised the U.S. natural rate of 
unemployment by about 1½  percentage points since 2007. 
 
This paper provides further evidence on the role of structural factors in accounting for 
the rise in U.S. unemployment (particularly long-term unemployment), as well as the rise in 
unemployment in other industrialized countries. Our measure of the intensity of structural 
shocks implements a conjecture by Black (1987) that periods of greater cross-industry 
dispersion in stock returns should be followed by increases in unemployment. The idea, as 
expressed in more recent work by Beaudry and Portier (2004) is that “stock prices are likely 
a good variable for capturing any changes in agents expectations about future economic 
conditions”. Hence the cross-industry dispersion of stock returns provides an “early signal of 
shocks that affect sectors differently, and puts more weight on shocks that investors expect to 
be permanent” (Black 1995). This latter point is important because it is presumably 
permanent shocks that motivate reallocation of labor across industries.  
 
While explaining developments in unemployment during the Great Recession is an 
important motivation for our work, the results should be of broader interest for a couple of 
reasons. First, as noted above, the relative importance on cyclical and structural factors has 
long been a source of debate, both in the U.S. and in other countries. While the stock market 
dispersion measure has been used before (Loungani, Rush and Tave, 1990; Brainard and 
Cutler, 1993; Loungani and Trehan, 1997), the work in the present paper represents a 
significant out-of-sample test of that earlier work. With the extension of the data set to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
conditions, the fact that tight labor markets coexist with slack ones.” They estimate that in the 2008-2009 




present, it now includes the recessions of 2001 and 2007-2009. We also test if, as seems 
reasonable, the impact of structural shocks is greater for long-term unemployment than for 
short-term unemployment. We also extend our results to a new data set, the sample of 12 
developed economies listed earlier in Figure 3.  Consistent with the earlier studies, the stock 
market dispersion measure accounts for a significant part of U.S. unemployment fluctuations 
after controlling for aggregate factors. Moreover, the dispersion index exerts a much greater 
impact of long-term unemployment than on short-term unemployment. In the cross-country 
work, we gain find that the unemployment rate increases significantly following an increase 
in stock market dispersion, after controlling for aggregate factors.   
 
Second, while not a direct test, our evidence provides support for recent theoretical 
work that assigns an important role to structural shocks. Phelan and Trejos (2000) show that 
permanent changes in sectoral composition can lead to aggregate downturns in a calibrated 
job creation/job destruction model of the U.S. labor market. Bloom (2009) and Bloom, 
Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009) propose “uncertainty shocks” as a source of aggregate 
fluctuations. Surges in uncertainty give firms pause in their hiring and investment decisions, 
leading to temporarily low factor usage. Bloom uses stock market volatility (in the time 
dimension) as an empirical measure of uncertainty in the economy.  Consistent with his 
argument that an increase in uncertainty has a temporary negative effect on the economy, we 
find that an increase in the volatility index raises short duration unemployment but has 
almost no effect on long duration unemployment.  Our stock market dispersion index has a 
larger effect on aggregate unemployment than Bloom’s uncertainty index and, as noted, its 
impact increases significantly as we move from short to long duration unemployment. 
 
Section II describes the construction of the stock market dispersion index. The next 
three sections present our evidence for the U.S economy. In section III, we use univariate 
regressions as in Romer and Romer (2003) to see how aggregate factors affect overall 
unemployment and long-term unemployment. Complementing this evidence, results from a 
VAR model are presented in section IV. In section V the VAR model is augmented to 
provide a comparison of the relative performance of the stock market dispersion index and 7 
 
 
Bloom’s uncertainty index. Cross-country evidence from a panel VAR is provided in section 
VI.  
   
II.   MEASURING SECTORAL SHIFTS 
The amount of labor reallocation that an economy has to carry out can change 
significantly over time. Some periods may be marked by relatively homogeneous growth in 
labor demand across sectors, whereas others may be characterized by shifts in the 
composition of labor demand. While beneficial in the long run, the reallocation of labor in 
response to sectoral shifts imposes short-run costs in the form of increases in unemployment. 
The greater the divergence in the fortunes of different industries, the more resources must be 
moved, and the larger will be the resulting increase in unemployment.  
 
While these ideas are fairly intuitive, constructing a satisfactory measure of sectoral 
shifts poses an empirical challenge for a couple of reasons. First, as stated by Barro (1986), 
shocks to the expected profitability of an industry can arrive from “many—mostly 
unobservable—disturbances to technology and preferences [that] motivate reallocations of 
resources across sectors.” Second, Davis (1985) points out that “allocative disturbances from 
any particular source are likely to occur rather infrequently over available sample sizes,” 
[italics ours] which makes it difficult to incorporate variables explicitly that capture the 
effects of sectoral shifts into an aggregate unemployment equation.  
  
These considerations motivated Lilien’s (1982) construction of a cross-industry 
employment dispersion index to proxy for the intersectoral flow of labor in response to 
allocative shocks. Lilien argued that frictions associated with the reallocation of labor across 
sectors of the economy accounted for as much as half of all fluctuations in unemployment. 
Many researchers, most notably Abraham and Katz (1986), however, have questioned 
Lilien’s use of employment dispersion as a measure of labor reallocation. Their basic point is 
that movements in employment dispersion may simply be reflecting the well-known fact that 
the business cycle has non-neutral effects across industries. The increase in the dispersion of 
employment growth rates could reflect not increased labor reallocation, but simply the 
uneven impact of aggregate demand shocks on temporary layoffs in different industries. 8 
 
 
Under certain conditions—for instance, if cyclically responsive industries have low trend 
growth rates of employment—aggregate demand shocks also can lead to a positive 
correlation between the dispersion index and aggregate unemployment. Hence there is an 
observational equivalence between the predictions of the sectoral shifts hypothesis and the 
more traditional “aggregate demand hypothesis.” Though Lilien’s paper inspired a significant 
amount of follow-up work, the debate over the relative importance of sectoral shifts and 
aggregate shocks in unemployment fluctuations remains unresolved—see Gallipoli and 
Pelloni (2008) for a comprehensive critical review of the literature. 
 
Loungani, Rush, and Tave (1990) and Brainard and Cutler (1993) attempt to 
circumvent these problems by constructing an index based on stock prices. Assuming that 
stock markets are efficient, so that shocks to the expected profitability of an industry are 
reflected in its stock market return, and assuming that these shocks are followed by changes 
in that industry’s use of inputs such as labor, their hypothesis is that the dispersion of stock 
returns across industries can be used as a proxy for shocks to the desired allocation of labor, 
i.e., as a measure of sectoral shifts. For instance, the arrival of positive news regarding the 
relative profitability of a particular industry is likely to be followed by an increase in stock 
price dispersion. In the long run, this news is likely to shift the economy’s output mix 
towards the affected industry. This will necessitate a reallocation of resources, and the 
unemployment rate will rise as part of this process of reallocation of labor across sectors. 
Thus, an increase in stock price dispersion will be followed by an increase in the 
unemployment rate. 
 
For this paper, we update the stock market index used in these earlier studies. The 
basic data consist of Standard and Poor’s indexes of industry stock prices. There are over 50 
industries, and they provide comprehensive coverage of manufacturing as well as 




















where Rit is the growth rate of industry i’s stock price index, Rt is the growth rate of the 
S&P500 (a composite index), and Wi is a weight based on the industry’s share in total 
employment. Hence, the sectoral shifts index can be interpreted as the weighted standard 
deviation of industry stock returns.  
 
An advantage of the stock price dispersion measure relative to Lilien’s measure is 
that unlike employment changes, stock prices respond more strongly to disturbances that are 
perceived to be permanent rather than temporary.  The industry stock price represents the 
present value of expected profits over time. If the shocks are purely temporary, the 
innovations will have little impact on the present value of expected profits and, hence, will 
have little impact on industries’ stock prices. But persistent shocks will have a significant 
impact on expected future profits and will lead to large changes in industries’ stock prices. 
Thus, a dispersion index constructed from industries’ stock prices automatically assigns 
greater weight to permanent structural changes than to temporary cyclical shocks, and so will 
be less likely to reflect aggregate demand disturbances than a measure based on employment. 
Furthermore, it is these persistent shocks that are likely to cause productive resources, such 
as capital and labor, to move across industries.   
 
  Figure 4 shows the behavior of the constructed stock price dispersion index for the 
U.S. over the period 1963 to 2010. The index displays some cyclical behavior, with recession 
periods typically associated with an increase in the dispersion index.  However, the 
correlation with the business cycle is far from perfect.  For instance, the magnitude of the 
increase in the index during a particular recession is not necessarily reflective of the depth of 
the recession. Increases during the 1974-75 recession and the 1990 recession, for example, 
are much higher than that experienced during the 1981 recession, even though the latter 
recession was more severe in terms of output loss.  This evidence suggests that changes in 
the relative profitability of industries during a contraction are not closely correlated with the 
size of the contraction, which is consistent with the interpretation that different recessions are 
marked by different mixes of sectoral and aggregate shocks.   Similarly, the dispersion index 
has also recorded increases during expansionary periods.  The dot-com boom experienced in 10 
 
 
the late 1990s provides a clear example, as stock prices in the information, technology, and 
communication sectors experienced much more rapid gains than the market average. 
 
III.   CANDIDATE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGES IN DURATION 
The behavior of the unemployment rate can potentially be influenced by a variety of 
factors, both cyclical as well as structural, not all of which can be simultaneously included in 
a moderately sized VAR.   Accordingly, in this section we compare the effects of the 
dispersion index on unemployment rates (of different durations) with the effects of other key 
macroeconomic variables, using a single-equation framework similar to Romer and Romer 
(2003) and Cerra and Saxena (2008). Specifically, we regress changes in the unemployment 
rate (ΔU) on its own lags as well as lagged values of the various “shocks”. The lagged values 
allow for delays in the impact of the shocks on unemployment.














1          (2)
 
 
Four candidate shocks are evaluated using this framework. The first two are monetary 
and fiscal (tax rate) policy shocks, as identified by Romer and Romer (2003, 2010). Both 
these shocks are constructed so as to be exogenous to changes in output through the use of 
narrative records of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meetings, presidential 
speeches and Congressional reports. The third shock examined is related to oil prices, and is 
simply measured as the percentage change in the real price of oil. Finally, we look at the 
effect of changes in the stock price dispersion index. For each of these shocks, standard 
errors for the impulse response functions are estimated using a bootstrap method.
4 
 
                                                 
3 A lag length of 4 quarters was found to be optimal. 
4 Specifically, 500 pseudo-coefficients are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution based on the estimates 
of the mean and variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficient vector.  11 
 
 
The impact of a one standard-deviation change in the various shocks on the level of 
the unemployment rate is shown in Figure 5. The unemployment rate increases following 
each shock, though the magnitude and significance of the responses vary across shocks. The 
response of unemployment to a monetary policy tightening is particularly large and 
persistent. A one standard deviation shock to monetary policy results in an increase in the 
unemployment rate of about 0.6 percent after 2 years. Shocks to fiscal policy, on the other 
hand, are small and insignificant. In contrast, increases in the real price of oil are associated 
with increases in the unemployment rate, with the peak impact occurring after 2 years. 
Finally, increases in the dispersion index are associated with a positive and significant 
change in the unemployment rate. A 1 standard deviation increase in the index results in an 
increase in the unemployment rate of about 0.2 percent after a year and a half.  
The long term unemployment rate (where duration exceeds 26 weeks) responds very 
differently to these shocks; see Figure 6. The typical response of the long-term 
unemployment rate to either a monetary policy shock, a fiscal policy shock or an increase in 
the real price of oil is small in magnitude and of the opposite sign to the response of the 
unemployment rate observed in Figure 5.   These responses are counter intuitive, but 
generally not significant at the 90 percent confidence interval. The response of the long-term 
unemployment rate to an increase in the dispersion index, however, is positive (as it is in 
Figure 4) and statistically significant. A one standard-deviation increase in the index results 
in a gradual increase in the long-term unemployment rate, peaking at around 0.1 percentage 
points after two years. Given that the average long-term unemployment rate in the U.S. for 
the last 40 years is about 0.9 percent, the impact of changes in the dispersion index on long-
term unemployment is relatively substantial. 
 
The findings above highlight the importance of the dispersion index, relative to other 
standard macroeconomic factors, in explaining variations in unemployment—particularly, 
long-term unemployment. Given our results here, we will not carry over the fiscal policy and 
oil price variables into the next section.   Before going further, it is worth pointing out that a 
regression of the dispersion index on lagged values of the monetary and fiscal policy shocks 




IV.   VARS ESTIMATED ON U.S. DATA 
In this section, we present the results from a VAR estimated on quarterly data from 
1963:Q1 to 2010:Q2. The baseline model contains six variables, including the stock market 
dispersion index and the unemployment rate.  The other variables are: real GDP growth, 
inflation, the federal funds rate, and the growth rate of the S&P500 index.  The inclusion of 
real GDP controls for the stage of the business cycle; it also means that our model allows for 
a version of “Okun’s Law.” The variable measuring returns on the S&P500 index is included 
to rule out the possibility that the dispersion index explains unemployment because it is 
mimicking the behavior of the aggregate stock market. Finally, following Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), the fed funds rate is included as a measure of monetary policy. The system is 
identified following the standard recursive ordering procedure. To avoid exaggerating the 
role of the dispersion index, we place it last in the estimation ordering. The other variables in 
the system are ordered as follows: GDP growth is placed first, followed by on the growth rate 
of the S&P 500, the unemployment rate, inflation and the fed funds rate.  A lag length of 6 
quarters was found to be optimal based on the Bayesian Information Criterion. 
 
A.   The Effects of Sectoral Shocks 
Figure 7 shows how unemployment responds to different shocks to the system, along 
with the associated 90 percent confidence intervals.
5 The unemployment rate declines 
following a shock to output growth, with a one standard deviation increase in the output 
growth rate leading to a 0.3 percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate after one 
year. Innovations to the fed funds rate, meanwhile, result in higher unemployment. Focusing 
on the response of unemployment to innovations in the dispersion index, we see that the 
unemployment rate gradually increases, with the response reaching a peak of about 0.3 
percentage points two years after the shock. The impact of these identified shocks to the 
dispersion index—purged of the aggregate influence of GDP, total market return, inflation 
and monetary policy—on unemployment is much higher than what we obtained from the 
regressions shown in the last section. 
                                                 
5 Standard errors are computed using the statistics based on the asymptotic distribution. 13 
 
 
  The long-term unemployment rate (Figure 8) shows a hump shaped response to 
innovations in the dispersion index, just as the overall unemployment rate (Figure 7).   
However, long-term unemployment reacts more gradually, reaching its peak only three years 
after the shock. The magnitude of the peak impact is again higher than what was found in the 
previous section. Long-term unemployment declines in response to output growth 
innovations, though just as with regards to dispersion shocks, the response is more delayed 
relative to the response of the overall unemployment rate. Long-term unemployment 
eventually increases following a shock to monetary policy, although the magnitude of the 
response is insignificant at the 90-percent confidence level.  
 
A decomposition of the variance of unemployment forecast errors provides further 
evidence as to the importance of the dispersion index in explaining unemployment 
fluctuations. Tables 1 and 2 show the proportion of the forecast-error variance of overall 
unemployment and long-term unemployment, respectively, that is explained by the various 
shocks, given our identification scheme. At the 5-year horizon, about 25 percent of the 
variance of unemployment forecast errors is explained by innovations to the dispersion 
index. The proportion is much higher when we consider variations in long-term 
unemployment. Looking once again at the 5-year horizon, innovations to the dispersion index 
account for up to 40 percent of the overall variance, making it more important than any other 
variable in the VAR, including the unemployment rate itself.  
 
Figure 9 shows how the role played by dispersion shocks changes as we look at 
different durations of unemployment.  For each duration of unemployment, the figure shows 
the proportion of the forecast error variance of the unemployment rate explained by 
innovations to the dispersion index at a 5 year horizon. In each case, the dispersion index is 
placed last in the ordering.  The figure displays a striking pattern, where the proportion of the 
variation in unemployment explained by shocks to the dispersion index increases 
monotonically with the duration of unemployment. For short-term unemployment (less than 
5 weeks), shocks to the dispersion index account for less than 5 percent of the overall 
variation in the unemployment rate. At this duration, shocks to inflation and the 
unemployment rate itself account for the bulk of the variation. But at the other end, where 14 
 
 
duration exceeds 26 weeks, dispersion shocks account for about 40 percent of the variance of 
the forecast error.  
 
B.   Sectoral Shocks and Long-Term Unemployment during the Great Recession 
We now use the VAR estimated above to examine long-term unemployment during 
the Great Recession.  Long term unemployment (defined as those who were unemployed for 
more than 26 weeks) constituted 16 percent of total unemployment in the fourth quarter of 
2007 and 40 percent in the second quarter of 2010.  Notably, it has remained high despite a 
resumption of growth in output. 
  
Figure 10 plots the long-term unemployment rate since the beginning of 2008, 
together with two forecasts.   The base period for both forecasts is chosen to be the fourth 
quarter of 2007, the start of the recession as declared by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. The forecast horizon extends to the second quarter of 2010, or 10 quarters. The 
line labeled “baseline projection” plots the conditional expectation of the long term 
unemployment rate over these 10 quarters as of 2007Q4.  In other words, it is the VAR’s 
forecast of the long-term unemployment rate as of 2007Q4.  For the first year of the forecast 
horizon, long-term unemployment remained close to the baseline projection, deviating at 
most by around .06 percentage points. Subsequently, however, long-term unemployment 
increased dramatically. During the second quarter of 2010, the long-term unemployment rate 
was more than 2 ½ percentage points higher than the baseline value. 
  
The third line in the chart shows what the VAR’s forecast of the long-term 
unemployment rate would have been if the orthogonalized dispersion shocks over the 
2008Q1-2010Q2 period had been known at the end of 2007.
6   Dispersion shocks turn out to 
be extremely important in explaining the departure of the realized unemployment rate from 
the baseline forecast.  From the beginning of 2009 up until the second quarter of 2010, 
shocks arising from the dispersion index accounted for more than half the difference between 
                                                 
6 See Fackler and McMillin (1998) or Lutkepohl (2005) for details. 15 
 
 
the actual long-term unemployment rate and its baseline projection. The contribution of 
shocks to GDP growth, on the other hand, averaged about 15 percent during the same period. 
 
C.   Structural vs. Cyclical Movements in Unemployment 
Our framework can be used to estimate a measure of structural unemployment over 
the whole sample period.  Each panel of figure 11 plots the unemployment rate of a specific 
duration together with the corresponding estimate of structural unemployment, which is 
denoted with an asterisk.  We define the structural unemployment rate to be the sum of the 
baseline unemployment rate and the contribution of dispersion shocks.  The forecast begins 
at the beginning of our estimation sample, so the baseline rate (not shown) converges 
relatively quickly to the long-run average of the series.  Thus, almost all the observed 
variation in the structural unemployment rate reflects dispersion shocks. 
 
The gap between the estimated structural unemployment rate and the actual rate 
provides a measure of the effects of “cyclical” factors, which in our specification arise from 
(orthogonalized) innovations to the growth rate of output, total market return, inflation and 
the fed funds rate, as well as the innovations to the series itself.
  Cyclical factors appear to be 
more relevant for short duration unemployment rates. For unemployment spells that are less 
than 5 weeks, for example, the estimated structural unemployment rate remains fairly 
constant through the whole sample compared to the actual rate, which is strongly cyclical 
(see the second panel of Figure 11). At the other extreme, when unemployment duration 
exceeds 26 weeks, the structural unemployment rate moves much more closely with actual 
unemployment.  The behavior of the structural unemployment rate is also different across 
different recessions. Looking at the behavior of total unemployment (the first panel), the 
cyclical component appears to be relatively more important during the recessions of the early 
80s and the early 90s and relatively less important during the mid-70s and the recent Great 
Recession. 
 
V.   SECTORAL SHOCKS VERSUS UNCERTAINTY 
We have shown that our measure of stock market volatility can help explain 
variations in the unemployment rate, and have argued that this measure represents the effects 16 
 
 
of sectoral shocks.  But it is possible to place other interpretations on measures of stock 
market volatility.  In particular, Bloom (2009) has advocated the use of one such measure as 
a proxy for uncertainty.  He argues that an increase in uncertainty can have significant 
negative effects on the economy, as firms optimally adopt a “wait-and-see” approach to 
capital expenditure and hiring decisions.  As stressed by Bloom, these effects are temporary.  
His VAR estimates show that an uncertainty shock causes employment to fall sharply over 
the first 6 months, but the rebound is equally rapid.  One year after the shock, employment is 
higher than it was prior to the shock. 
 
Bloom’s index differs from ours, in that it is a measure of time series volatility.  More 
specifically, from 1962 to 1985, the series is based on the actual monthly standard deviation 
of the daily S&P 500 index. From 1986 onwards, the series is the VXO index of implied 
volatility constructed by the Chicago Board of Options Exchange.  By contrast, our index is 
meant to capture cross section volatility; it measures how individual stock returns differ from 
the aggregate index at a point in time.
7 
 
Figure 12 plots Bloom’s uncertainty index alongside the stock market dispersion 
index.  The two measures tend to move together, particularly towards the latter part of the 
sample. The close correlation of the two series makes one wonder about how well the 
uncertainty index might explain unemployment, and, in particular, whether one would find a 
difference in how long-term unemployment responds to the dispersion index and how it 
responds to the uncertainty index. 
 
To investigate this issue, we re-estimate the VARs from the previous section---which 
differ only in the duration of unemployment variable---with the uncertainty index replacing 
the dispersion series. There is no change to any of the other variables in the system. Just as 
with the dispersion index, the uncertainty index is placed last in the ordering. Figure 13 plots 
                                                 
7 Bloom (2009) points out that his index is correlated with measures of firm level idiosyncratic shocks such as 
the distribution of profits across firms, a cross sectional TFP measure for manufacturing as well as a cross 
sectional monthly stock measure, and shows that regressing his volatility index on these measures leads to R
2s 
between 0.24 and 0.38, where the equations also contain controls such as industry and time dummies, etc. 17 
 
 
the response of the long-term unemployment rate to uncertainty shocks from this system; for 
easier comparison, we also reproduce the corresponding graph from the original VAR.  There 
is a clear difference in how the long-term unemployment rate responds to the two shocks. 
Long-term unemployment tends to peak earlier in response to an uncertainty-index shock 
(about 6 to 7 quarters) than to a dispersion-index shock (about 12 to 13 quarters).   Moreover, 
the effect of the former is statistically indistinguishable from zero after about 2 years, while 
the effect of the latter can be distinguished from zero for about 5 years after the shock.  The 
magnitude of the responses is also markedly different, with the peak response to a one-
standard-deviation shock to the dispersion series about 3 times greater than the peak response 
to a one-standard-deviation shock to the uncertainty index. 
 
Comparing the results across different unemployment durations reinforces the 
difference between the indexes.  Again for ease of comparison, the top panel of Figure 14 
shows the contribution of the stock market dispersion index to the variance decomposition of 
unemployment at different durations at horizon 20. The bottom panel provided similar 
information for the uncertainty index.  As the variance decompositions in Figure 14 reveal, 
the uncertainty index does best in explaining short duration unemployment.  For 
unemployment duration of 5 weeks or less, it explains more than a fifth of the variance of 
unemployment (at a horizon of 20 quarters).   For unemployment durations of 15 weeks or 
longer, the uncertainty index explains noticeably less than one tenth of the total variance.  
This is reminiscent of  the findings in Bloom (2009), where uncertainty shocks appear to 
have a greater impact on activity at the shorter horizon.  By contrast, the importance of the 
dispersion measure actually increases as the duration of unemployment goes up, and it 
explains roughly 40 percent of the variance of the longest duration unemployment.  Notice 
also that the dispersion index explains about 25 percent of the variance of the overall 
unemployment rate, while the uncertainty index explains less than 10 percent.  
 
As a final check, we included both the uncertainty measure and the dispersion index 
in the VAR, with the dispersion index being ordered last and the uncertainty measure just 
above it. Both the response function of long-term unemployment (not shown), as well as the 
variance decomposition (Table 3), show that the dispersion index continues to play a 18 
 
 
significant role.  For instance, at the 20 quarter horizon, the dispersion index explains about 
27 percent of the forecast error variance of the long duration unemployment rate, while the 
uncertainty index explains less than 4 percent. 
 
VI.   A VAR ESTIMATED ON INTERNATIONAL DATA 
In this section, we present cross-country evidence on the importance of the stock 
market dispersion index in explaining unemployment fluctuations. The suitability of this 
index as a proxy for sectoral shocks will differ across countries depending on the depth of 
their stock markets and whether or not the set of listed firms is representative of the whole 
economy. The dispersion of stock market returns in relatively thin markets, for example, 
could be very volatile due to the influence of a few large firms, or of foreign capital flows. In 
order to minimize such distortions, we limit our analysis to a sample of advanced economies 
that have relatively deep and broad stock markets.  The countries in our sample are Australia, 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.
8 
 
We did not add more countries to our sample because we were unable to get stock 
market data of sufficient length.  The move to an international setting forced us to confront 
several other data issues as well. While data on stock returns at the industry level are 
obtainable across countries, comparable disaggregate data on employment by industry are not 
consistently available. A breakdown of sectoral employment at the broad national accounts 
classification is available, but this is too coarse a breakdown to be applied to the more 
disaggregated industry stock return data. As a result of this data limitation, we weight the 
stock returns by the industry’s share of market capitalization. To minimize large fluctuations 
in these shares, we use a rolling 10-year average. A further data complication is the lack of 
cross-country measures of monetary policy. Changes in nominal short-term interest rates, 
unlike the fed funds rate, contain both policy-induced changes as well as other endogenous 
responses to disturbances unrelated to policy shifts. Still, for this set of advanced economies, 
                                                 
8 Adding the U.S. to this sample does not make a material difference to the results below. 19 
 
 
monetary policy is best represented by changes in interest rates. Therefore, instead of the 
nominal rate, we combine the measures of inflation and the nominal interest rate to construct 
an ex-post real interest rate, which we include in the VAR. Finally, long-term unemployment 
rate data are not consistently available for these countries, i.e., we are unable to get data 
series of sufficient length.  Consequently, the analysis is limited to the overall unemployment 
rate. 
 
The setup of the VAR is similar to the previous section, but now the data have both a 
cross-sectional and time-series dimension. As such, we estimate a panel VAR (see Love and 
Zicchino, 2006, for example) where the coefficients on the VAR are restricted to be the same 
across all cross-sectional units. Country-specific fixed effects, however, are included. The 
ordering is the same as it was in the previous section: GDP growth is ordered first, followed 
by total market return, unemployment, real interest rate and, lastly, the dispersion of stock 
market returns. GMM methods are used to estimate the system is estimated over the period 
1965:Q2 to 2008:Q3 (see Arellano and Bond, 1991, 1995).
9 The lag length is set at 12 
quarters. 
 
The impulse-response functions for unemployment are shown in Figure 15. Each 
panel shows the response of the unemployment rate to a one-standard-deviation shock, with 
the residuals orthogonalized according to the ordering above. The impulse-response graphs 
look similar to those for the U.S.  For instance, unemployment increases after an increase in 
stock market dispersion and decreases after a positive growth shock.  Interestingly, the 
magnitude of the responses is also of the same order. A one-standard-deviation shock to the 
dispersion index results in a maximum increase of about 0.3 percentage points in the 
unemployment rate here, just as it did for U.S. data. However, the response of unemployment 
to the dispersion shock is noticeably delayed; it also persists for much longer.  In the cross-
country data, the peak impact on unemployment is reached only after 6 years, while the peak 
in U.S. data is reached after 2 years. 
 
                                                 
9 For most countries, however, the stock market data only starts in 1973. 20 
 
 
The other impulse responses also show more persistence in the international panel 
than they do for the U.S. data.  For instance, the response of the unemployment rate to an 
unemployment rate shock is statistically indistinguishable from zero less than two years after 
the shock in the U.S. data set (Figure 7), but can still be distinguished from zero more than 
six years after the shock in the international data set (Figure 15).   Many observers have 
noted the tendency of the unemployment rates in European countries
10 to stay high for long 
periods of time following adverse shocks.  This has led to discussions of hysteresis in the 
unemployment rate; see Blanchard and Summers (1986) for an early example, or Blanchard 
(2006) for a more recent discussion. 
  
The dispersion index also continues to account for a significant proportion of the 
forecast error variance for unemployment, and—as in the U.S. data—its importance grows 
over time.  Table 4 shows that at a forecast horizon of 40 quarters, dispersion shocks account 
for about 18 percent of the variation in the unemployment rate. This is about three-fourths of 
what we get for the U.S. data at the same horizon.  And just as in the U.S. data, apart from 
shocks to the unemployment rate itself, dispersion shocks are the most important in 
explaining the variance of the unemployment rate at long horizons. 
 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
  We have shown that structural shocks (as measured by an index of the cross section 
variance of stock prices) have a substantial impact on the unemployment rate in a sample that 
includes the Great Recession of 2007-2009.  Further, these shocks become more important as 
the duration of unemployment increases, a finding that accords with the intuition that such 
shocks should be associated with longer spells of search, as they cause workers to move 
across sectors. 
  
An examination of the Great Recession shows that sectoral shocks account for about 
half of the increase in the long duration unemployment rate that has taken place over this 
period.  Once again, this accords with informal evidence about employment conditions in the 
                                                 
10 With the exception of Australia, all the countries in our sample are in Europe. 21 
 
 
construction sector and, to a lesser extent, in finance.  In this, the Great Recession is similar 
to the recession of 1973-75, as sectoral shocks appear to have played a large role at that time 
as well. 
  
We have also shown that our measure of cross section volatility is quite different 
from the measure of time series volatility proposed by Bloom (2009).  In particular, Bloom’s 
measure does very well at explaining short duration unemployment, but has a small impact 
on long duration unemployment.  By contrast, our measure does better the longer the 
duration of unemployment under consideration.  We interpret these findings to mean that 
both measures are well suited to the purpose for which they were designed.   The time series 
measure is meant to capture uncertainty, and Bloom emphasizes that uncertainty has a short 
run effect.  By contrast, our measure is meant to capture shocks that cause reallocation across 
sectors, and such reallocation is going to take time. 
  
Finally, we have shown that the dispersion index continues to matter in a sample of a 
dozen advanced economies.  While we have not been able to find adequate data on long 
duration unemployment for these countries, we have shown that an increase in stock market 
dispersion leads to a substantial and significant increase in the unemployment rate, even after 
we control for output, inflation and the value of the stock market. 
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5  41.9%  14.8%  34.7%  2.6%  1.9%  4.1% 
10  24.9%  16.0%  15.1%  10.0%  8.2%  25.8% 
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